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I. Introduction
On August 26, 1998, the California
Supreme Court granted review in the case of
City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency.1 The case,
an appeal of adjudication of groundwater
rights, raises important questions not only
about groundwater but surface water rights as
well. The California Supreme Court will likely
define some important issues, including the
flexibility of “reasonable use,” the value of the
rights of an overlying user vis-a-vis an appro-
priator, and the extent to which a physical
solution may be imposed. This comment
argues that the court should provide (1) guid-
ance for water rights holders regarding how
much reliance they can place on their “right,”
and (2) guidance on what “reasonable use”
means. Does “reasonable use” mean that use
which provides the most water for the greatest
number of users? Or, is there a preference for
those users who have an historical priority
water right? 
Part II provides a brief statement of the
facts of the Mojave case. Part III discusses the
history of groundwater law in California. Part
IV analyzes the tools that courts have tradi-
tionally used to solve conflicts between com-
peting water users, and proposes some new
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1. See City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 961 P.2d 398
(1998).
II. Statement of Facts
Only God gives water. God gave it to me, and I can
take it.2
The Mojave River system is more than 90
miles long.3 The groundwater basin associated
with the river is approximately 3600 square
miles.4 Most people agree that basin overdraft5
began in the 1950s.6 By 1990, agricultural and
municipal users were drawing approximately
230,000 acre-feet annually.7 The parties to the
lawsuit dispute whether the total water supply
to the basin is 78,600 acre-feet per year or
75,710 acre-feet per year.8
The original complaint was filed in 1990 by
the City of Barstow and Southern California
Water Company, alleging that groundwater
production upstream of the City of Barstow
was adversely affecting Barstow’s water sup-
ply.9 The complaint requested a writ of man-
date requiring Mojave Water Agency (“MWA”)
to perform its duties and provide supplemen-
tal water by importing State Water Project
(“SWP”) water for use within the Mojave
Basin.10
In 1991, MWA filed an amended cross-com-
plaint that named all water producers who
“collectively claim substantially all rights of
water use within the Mojave Basin area,”11
meaning all water producers within the Mojave
River watershed, except for a few small produc-
ers.12 The amended cross-complaint requested
a declaration that the available water supply to
the Mojave Basin area is inadequate to meet
the demands of producers within the water-
shed, and requested a determination of the
water rights.13 The suit involved more than 1000
producers in the Mojave Basin Area and hydro-
logic subareas which extend over 4000 square
miles.14
On October 16, 1991, the trial court
ordered a litigation standstill while a commit-
tee of engineers and attorneys attempted to
formulate a physical solution.15 After two years
of engineering studies and negotiations, cost-
ing hundreds of thousands of dollars,16 a draft
physical solution was submitted to the trial
court.17 The trial court determined that the
physical solution was “necessary to implement
the mandate of Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution,”18 and ordered that all
parties be notified that they had the choice of
either stipulating to the physical solution, fil-
ing an answer to the cross-complaint, or
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2. Karen Brandon, Desert Farmers Tap into Water Battle, CHI.
TRIB., April 11, 1999, at C3 (quoting Jo Ann Auerswald, interim
general manager of the Mojave Water Agency, who was quoting a
farmer).
3. See Eric L. Garner & Steven M. Anderson, The California
Supreme Court Reviews the Mojave River Adjudication, 2 U. COLO. WATER
L. REV. 1, 35 (1998).
4. See id.
5. Overdraft occurs when more water is extracted from the
groundwater basin than is available as surplus. See City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1307 (1975).
6. See Garner & Anderson, supra note 3, at 35.
7. See id. at 36.
8. See City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, No. 208568,
Amended Statement of Decision at 7 (Superior Court, County of
Riverside, January 2, 1996) [hereinafter Decision].
9. See City of Barstow v. City of Adelanto, No. 208568,
Judgment After Trial at 1 (Superior Court, County of Riverside,
January 10, 1996) [hereinafter Judgment].
10. See id.; see also City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency,
75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 482 (1998). MWA generally has the power to
take necessary steps “so that sufficient water may be available for
any present or future beneficial use or uses of the lands or inhab-
itants of the agency . . . .” MWA also has the power to seek a court
adjudication of water rights within the Basin. See Mojave, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 482 (quoting CAL. WATER CODE APPEN. §§ 97-15, 97-37).
11. Judgment, supra note 9, at 1.
12. See Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482.
13. See Judgment, supra note 9, at 1; see also Mojave, 75 Cal.
Rptr 2d at 482.
14. See Judgment, supra note 9, at 5.
15. See id. at 2; see also Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482. A
“physical solution” is usually an engineering control implement-
ed to provide water for more users. Examples of physical solu-
tions include lining a canal to prevent seepage loss, using sub-
stitute surface water supplies, or regulating diversion and reser-
voir release schedules. Even a senior user may be required to
bear some of the burden of implementing a physical solution. See
ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERIC L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 175-76
(1995).
16. See Judgment, supra note 9, at 5.
17. See Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482.
18. Judgment, supra note 9, at 6.
19. See Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482.
parties agreed to the stipulated judgment, with
additional parties agreeing after entry of the
judgment.20 These parties represented over
eighty percent of the verified water production
in the Mojave Basin.21 By an interlocutory judg-
ment, the trial court then imposed the physical
solution upon the stipulating parties.22 The
trial court determined the quantity of water
that each party could use without regard for
the water rights of riparian and overlying farm-
ers in the basin.23 The court also imposed the
physical solution on alfalfa farmers and dairy-
men who had never agreed to the plan.24
Although the majority of the parties, repre-
senting over eighty percent of the verified
water production in the Mojave Basin, agreed
to the stipulated judgment,25 the non-stipulat-
ing parties went to trial. The non-stipulating
parties include the Cardozo Appellants, an
association of dairy farmers owning overlying
lands in the Mojave Basin, and the Jess Ranch
Water Company.26
At trial, the court identified the following
issues to be determined: “(1) characterization
of water rights; (2) priority, if any; (3) what are
the uses? (4) are the uses reasonable? (5) the
amount of reasonable and beneficial use.”27
Other issues for trial were identification of sub-
areas, whether the physical solution provides
an equitable apportionment of water, and
whether the physical solution satisfies the
requirements of Article X, Section 2 of the
California Constitution.28
In a 25-page statement of decision, the
trial court concluded that “the constitutional
mandate of reasonable and beneficial use dic-
tates an equitable apportionment of all rights
when a water basin is in overdraft.”29 Deciding
it was unnecessary to adjudicate individual
water rights, the court found that the proposed
physical solution was fair and equitable to
non-stipulating parties. The trial court then
issued a 153-page judgment, filed on January
10, 1996. Several parties appeal the judgment.
The Cardozo Appellants, who claim to hold
overlying rights which they use on their prop-
erty for agricultural purposes, argue that the
judgment should be reversed as being contrary
to established California law.30 The Jess Ranch
Water Company31 only argue that its water allo-
cation was improperly calculated.32
The court of appeal found that the trial
court erred in imposing the physical solution
on parties who had not stipulated to the phys-
ical solution.33 The court of appeal objected to,
among other things, the trial court’s disregard
for the farmers’ historical priority in water
rights.34
In the case pending before the California
Supreme Court, MWA, the City of Barstow, and
Southern California Water Company are the
respondents. MWA contends that the physical
solution was properly imposed by the trial
court, and that the Cardozo Appellants failed
to prove that they had water rights that were
adversely affected. MWA also argues that the
area’s Base Annual Production35 (“BAP”)
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20. See Mojave Water Agency (visited March 4, 2000)
<http://www.mojavewater.org/mwa>.
21. See id.
22. See Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483.
23. See id. at 482.
24. See Marc Lifsher, High Court Set to Hear Case on Water Law,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1999, California Report, at 1.
25. See Mojave Water Agency, supra note 20.
26. See Garner & Anderson, supra note 3, at 38. The court of
appeal uses the term “Cardozo Appellants” to refer to the follow-
ing appellants: Manuel and Maria Cardozo, Niel DeVries, Virgil
Gorman, Richard and Geneva Leyerly, Jerry Osterkamp, David and
Elizabeth Daily, Richard and Elaine Fitzwater, Cornelis J. Groen,
Robert T. and Barbara T. Older and Steve Older. See Mojave, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 483 n.3. 
27. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483.
28. See id. Article X, Section 2 established that all water
rights are limited by the concept of “reasonable and beneficial”
use. The full text of Article X, Section 2 is quoted infra at note 55.
29. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483. 
30. See id. 
31. The trial court found that Jess Ranch failed to establish
that its use of 18,625 acre-feet in 1986 was a reasonable and ben-
eficial use. Specifically, the trial court found that Jess Ranch was
in the process of changing the uses of its property from agricul-
tural to residential and commercial, and that the future con-
sumptive use would be only 1300 acre-feet per year. See id. at 503. 
32. See id. at 483.
33. See id. at 482.
34. See id. at 501.
35. See definition of Base Annual Production infra Part II.A.
36. See Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 483.
The City of Barstow and Southern California
Water Company contend that (1) Article X,
Section 2 requires a court to equitably appor-
tion water among users in an overdrafted area,
(2) the Mojave River Basin is an overdrafted
area, and (3) the trial court properly considered
the relevant factors before imposing a physical
solution.37
A. The Physical Solution
According to the trial court, the physical
solution is intended to define the water rights of
all producers in a way that will “equitably allo-
cate the natural water supplies and which will
provide for equitable sharing of costs for
Supplemental Water.”38 The purpose of the phys-
ical solution is to “establish a legal and practical
means for making the maximum reasonable ben-
eficial use of the waters of the Basin Area.”39
The judgment divides the Mojave Basin into
five hydrologically interrelated “subareas.”40 The
Mojave River is identified as the common source
of supply for the entire Basin.41 For each subarea,
the judgment identified the BAP. The BAP is the
greatest amount of water produced in any year by
each party within the subarea during the five year
period preceding the filing of the action.42 The
BAP for each subarea will decrease five percent
per year for the first five years of operations
under the judgment. Thus, in the fifth year, the
BAP will be eighty percent of the original
amount. Following the fifth year, there is the pos-
sibility that the BAP could be adjusted in each
subarea separately, depending on the conditions
in each subarea.43
Within each subarea each party was assigned
a Free Production Allowance (“FPA”) which is the
amount that party is allowed to pump based on
a percentage of the subarea’s BAP.44 Any water
produced in excess of a party’s FPA must be
replaced by that party, either by paying sufficient
funds to purchase replacement water, or by
transfer of unused FPA from another party/pro-
ducer.45 The judgment assumes that sufficient
water will be available to meet the needs of the
Basin in the future from a combination of natural
and imported water, water conservation, water
reuse and transfers of FPA among producers.46
The judgment goes beyond allotting water to
the parties; it also includes special provision for
environmental protection.47 It provides for the
creation of a Biological Resources Trust Fund to
secure a water supply in the event that ground-
water levels within specific areas are not sup-
porting existing riparian vegetation.48 The MWA,
in its brief to the California Supreme Court,
states, “the judgment in this case goes further
than Pasadena, and provides for allocation of
costs and importation of water and recognizes
the need to develop the infrastructure to import,
store and distribute that water.”49 Rather than
simply divide up existing resources among the
parties, the judgment creates resources to sup-
ply the region with water in the future.
III. California Groundwater Law
[W]estern water is governed by one of the most out-
moded collection of rules found anywhere in American pub-
lic policy.50
California groundwater law was initially
based on English common law.51 Like riparian
landowners who have the right to use the adja-
cent surface water, the owner of the land over-
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37. See id.
38. Judgment, supra note 9, at 6.
39. Id. at 25.
40. The basins are interrelated, but divided into subareas
by the Helendale and Waterman Faults. See Decision, supra note
8, at 6. (Superior Court, County of Riverside, January 2, 1996).
41. See id. at 14.
42. See id. This method was originally used in City of
Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 28 (1949).
43. See Respondents’ Brief at 15, City of Barstow v. Mojave
Water Agency, 961 P.2d 398 (1998) (No. S071728) [hereinafter
Respondents’ Brief].
44. See id.
45. See Mojave Water Agency Fact Sheet, Summary of the




48. See id. 
49. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 43, at 22 n.28.
50. SARAH H. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS 4
(1993).
51. See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 15, at 49.
that groundwater.52 Any water not used by over-
lying owners is “surplus” water. Surplus water
can be appropriated for use on land other than
overlying land.53 The California Supreme Court
has defined groundwater rights as follows:
Rights in water in an underground
basin . . . are classified as overlying, appropria-
tive and prescriptive. Generally speaking, an
overlying right, analogous to that of a riparian
owner in a surface stream, is the right of [the]
owner of the land to take water from the
ground underneath for use on his land within
the basin or watershed; the right is based on
ownership of the land and is appurtenant
thereto. The right of an appropriator depends
upon an actual taking of water.54
The rule of priority, as articulated by the
court, is modified by the California
Constitution. Article X, Section 2 establishes
that all water rights are limited by the concept
of “reasonable and beneficial” use.55 This “rea-
sonable use” doctrine leaves water rights sub-
ject to interpretation by the judiciary. If a court
finds an overlying owner’s use to be “unreason-
able,” the court has the authority to grant part
of that water right to a junior appropriator
whose use is “reasonable.”56
The judiciary’s application of Article X,
Section 2 has defined groundwater law in
California.57 According to one California water
scholar, the result of these cases has been that
“California groundwater law is confusing and
generally inadequate to the task of regulating
the state’s groundwater resources.”58
A. Katz v. Walkinshaw
In Katz v. Walkinshaw, the California
Supreme Court rejected the idea that owners of
land overlying an aquifer have absolute rights
to pump groundwater for use on their land.59
Instead, the court held that groundwater is
governed by the doctrine of “correlative rights
and reasonable use.”60 This gives each overly-
ing property owner a common right to the rea-
sonable, beneficial use of the aquifer below the
overlying land.61 Overlying owners have first
priority to the groundwater beneath the land
they own. Each overlying landowner has correl-
ative rights, with all other overlying owners, to
a reasonable share of the safe yield of the
aquifer.62 Courts generally have defined “safe
yield” as the long-term recharge of the
aquifer.63
Katz determined that groundwater use
among overlying landowners is governed by a
standard of “reasonableness,” similar to sur-
face water use. Appropriators (non-overlying
users) may take water from the aquifer only if
there is a surplus safe yield left over after the
reasonable needs of all overlying landowners
have been met.64 Appropriators may pump the
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52. See id.
53. See id. at 50.
54. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 207 P.2d
17, 28 (1975).
55. Cal. Const. art. X, § 2 (West Supp. 1993). The full text
of the section reads: 
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions
prevailing in this State the general welfare requires
that the water resources of the State be put to benefi-
cial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable,
and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreason-
able method of use of water be prevented, and that
the conservation of such waters is to be exercised with
a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in
the interest of the people and for the public welfare.
The right to water or to the use or flow of water in or
from any natural stream or water course attach to but
to no more than so much of the flow thereof as may be
required or used consistently with this section, for the
purposes for which such lands are, or may be made
adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial
uses; provided, however, that nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed as depriving any riparian
owner of the reasonable use of water of the stream to
which the owner’s land is riparian under reasonable
methods of diversion and use, or as depriving any
appropriator of water to which the appropriator is law-
fully entitled. This section shall be self-executing, and
the Legislature may also enact laws in the furtherance
of the policy in this section contained. 
Id. 
56. For a discussion of cases where the judiciary has inter-
preted “reasonable use,” see infra Part IV.A.1.
57. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (1903); City of
Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17 (1949); City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250 (1975).
58. Brian E. Gray, Groundwater Rights (1999) (unpublished
course materials on file with author).
59. 74 P. at 766.
60. LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 15, at 49.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 47.
64. See id. at 51.
the aquifer.65 As with surface water appropria-
tion,66 groundwater appropriators are gov-
erned by a system of priority: “first in time,
first in right.”67
B. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra
In City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, the
California Supreme Court addressed the
rights of groundwater users when an aquifer is
in chronic overdraft. Interestingly, the court
did not enforce the hierarchy of rights articu-
lated in Katz; instead the court applied a doc-
trine of “mutual prescription.”68 According to
this doctrine, all users receive a pro rata share
of the safe yield of the aquifer. The court ruled
that each user’s share should be quantified
based on “the highest continuous production
of water for beneficial use in any five year
period prior to the filing of the complaint” and
after the overdraft of the aquifer com-
menced.69 The court held that all of the overly-
ing and appropriative users had acquired pre-
scriptive rights against each other, thus the
term “mutual prescription.”70 The principles of
“mutual prescription” look similar to what the
trial court applied in Mojave.71 However, the
Mojave court does not use the phrase “mutual
prescription” because, in City of Los Angeles v.
City of San Fernando, the court limited the doc-
trine of mutual prescription to the facts of the
Pasadena case.72
C. City of Los Angeles v. City of San
Fernando
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando par-
tially overrules the doctrine of mutual pre-
scription, by holding that prescriptive rights
cannot be asserted against public utilities
and agencies.73 The court rejects the mechan-
ical application of mutual prescription,
because it “does not necessarily result in the
most equitable apportionment of water
according to need.”74 In discussing equitable
apportionment, the court states that “a true
equitable apportionment would take into
account many . . . factors.”75 In a footnote, the
court quotes Nebraska v. Wyoming, a United
States Supreme Court case, to illustrate how
the Court equitably apportions water among
states.76 The Mojave court, however, points out
that in Nebraska the Supreme Court allocated
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65. See id. at 53.
66. Surface water law closely parallels groundwater law. A
riparian owner, similar to an overlying user, has the right to use
water in a natural watercourse that abuts property owned by the
riparian. A riparian water right is not quantified; it is a right to use
as much water as the riparian can put to reasonable and benefi-
cial use, so long as other riparians are not injured. The riparian
right is correlative; one riparian does not have priority over
another riparian. An appropriative water right, however, has a pri-
ority component, based on who first appropriates the water and
uses it for a reasonable, beneficial purpose. This is called “first in
time, first in right.” Among appropriators, a hierarchy is created
of senior and junior appropriative water rights. See LITTLEWORTH &
GARNER, supra note 15, at 29-40.
67. In California, the custom of appropriation was used
originally by miners. Most mining camps were on public lands,
and no one could own that land. In 1872, the California legisla-
ture codified the right to appropriate water. See id. at 30. See also
Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 145-47 (1855).
68. See City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17,
28 (1975).
69. See id.
70. See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 15, at 54.
71. See generally Judgment, supra note 9.
72. See 537 P.2d 1250 (1975).
73. See Los Angeles, 537 P.2d at 1298.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. n.61. Footnote 61 reads: 
The principles by which the United States Supreme
Court equitably apportions water among states are
illustrated in Nebraska v. Wyoming (1945) 325 U.S. 589,
618. After observing that apportionment between
states whose laws base water rights on priority of
appropriation should primarily accord with that prin-
ciple, the court said: ‘But if an allocation between
appropriation States is to be just and equitable, strict
adherence to the priority rule may not be possible. For
example, the economy of a region may have been
established on the basis of junior appropriations. So
far as possible those established uses should be pro-
tected though strict application of the priority rule
might jeopardize them. Apportionment calls for the
exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration
of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guid-
ing principle. But physical and climatic conditions, the
consumptive use of water in the several sections of the
river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent
of established uses, the availability of storage water,
the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream
areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to
the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is
imposed on the former—these are all relevant factors.
They are merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive cat-
alogue. They indicate the nature of the problem of
apportionment and the delicate adjustment of inter-
ests which must be made.’
adjudicate the relative rights of appropriators
amongst themselves.77
4. Summary of California 
Groundwater Law
Unlike surface water appropriative rights,
use of groundwater is not regulated under a
statewide permit system. In general, property
owners with land overlying groundwater can
simply drill wells and extract water.78 Until
Pasadena, the law allowed each overlying owner
“the quantity reasonably necessary and avail-
able.”79 After Pasadena, the general rule in cases
of water shortage has been that “all overlying
owners are entitled to a fair and just propor-
tion of the available waters.”80 Historically,
owners of land overlying percolating waters
had paramount rights.81 Appropriative rights
attach only to surplus water.
IV. Reaction to the Mojave Decision
Groundwater in the Mojave has been overdrawn for
more than four decades. Supply is so limited that
groundwater could not meet the needs of either agricul-
ture or the cities, let alone both. Groundwater through-
out the state is being used much more rapidly than it
can be replenished. . . . In some regions, including sec-
tions of the Mojave, overdraft has led the land to collapse
on the vacuum beneath it.82
In granting review to Mojave, the California
Supreme Court will “address a fundamental
question about California groundwater law:
Can someone with a historic right to an under-
ground water supply pump as much as he or
she wants even when downstream users, such
as rapidly developing cities, face potential
shortfalls?”83 In 1995, when the trial court
decided the Mojave River adjudication, Business
Wire reported it as:
[T]he first successful major water rights
and system adjudication in California
in approximately 20 years. . . . The deci-
sion establishes a management system
for the surface and groundwater sys-
tem which supplies the residents and
businesses of the Mojave River Basin,
an area of more than 4000 square miles
north and east of the San Bernardino
Mountains.84
After the trial court’s decision, counsel for
one of the largest purveyors of water in the
region said: “This judgment is a victory for the
whole region. It will bring to an end the over-
draft of the Mojave Basin and allow for the sus-
tainable development of the area. It will pro-
tect millions of dollars of investments made in
the area since the overdraft began.”85
But, there are farmers and others who do
not agree that the decision is a victory. “Any
alteration of farmers’ historic ownership of
water as ‘vested property rights,’ the [California
Farm Bureau Federation] warns . . . , ‘will sig-
nificantly impact farmers and ranchers in all
parts of the state.’”86 Cities like San Francisco
with historical “vested” water rights are siding
with agriculture in this debate. Any change in
the common law priority system for deciding
groundwater and surface water disputes could
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77. “The standard of an equitable apportionment requires
an adaptation of the formula to the necessities of the particular
situation. We may assume that the rights of the appropriators
inter se may not be adjudicated in their absence. But any alloca-
tion between Wyoming and Nebraska, if it is to be fair and just,
must reflect the priorities of appropriators in the two States.”
Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 490 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325
U.S. 589, 627 (1945)).
78. See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 15, at 47.
79. See id. at 52.
80. Id. (citing City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207
P.2d 17 (1949)).
81. See, e.g., California Water Service Co. v. Edward
Sidebotham & Son, Inc., 37 Cal. Rptr 1, 10 (1964).
82. Brandon, supra note 2, at C3.
83. Lifsher, supra note 24, at 1.
84. Judge Decides in Mojave River Adjudication, BUS. WIRE, Sept.
14, 1995.
85. Id.
86. Lifsher, supra note 24, at 1.
IV. Analysis
A. Physical Solutions in California Case
Law
Generally, courts account for existing rights
and priorities when choosing a physical solu-
tion.87 In 1935, in Tulare Irrigation District v.
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District, the
California Supreme Court encouraged the trial
court to use a physical solution, if practicable:
The equity courts possess broad pow-
ers and should exercise them so as to
do substantial justice . . . the equity
court is not bound or limited by the
suggestions or offers made by the par-
ties to this, or any similar, action[. I]f
the trial court, on the retrial, comes to
the conclusion, based upon proper evi-
dence, that a substantial saving can be
effected at a reasonable cost, by repair-
ing or changing some of the ditches . .
. it undoubtedly has the power . . . to
make its injunctive order subject to
conditions which it may suggest and to
apportion the cost thereof as justice
may require, keeping in mind the fact that
respondents have prior rights and cannot be
required lawfully to incur any material
expense in order to accommodate appellant.88
The following year, the court repeated the
encouragement in a case appealing a decree
ordering East Bay Municipal Utility District
(“EBMUD”) to make large releases of water so
that the groundwater table below a down-
stream city would not be lowered.89 The court
said “before issuing a decree entailing such
waste of water, [the trial court must] ascertain
whether there exists a physical solution of the
problem presented that will avoid the waste.”90
In Peabody v. City of Vallejo, the California
Supreme Court said that on retrial, if the trial
court determined that a physical solution is
ascertainable, “the court has the power to
make and should make reasonable regulations
for the use of water by the respective parties,
provided they be adequate to protect the one having the
paramount right in the substantial enjoyment thereof
and to prevent its ultimate destruction.”91
In City of Los Angeles, the court stated on
remand that, the trial court should consider
the possibility of a physical solution. “The
usual purpose of a physical solution is to avoid
a waste of water without unreasonably or adversely
affecting the rights of the parties.”92 The court noted
that the trial court had equitable discretion to
find a physical solution which was fair and just
to all parties.93
It is not unprecedented, however, for a
court to order the senior user to participate
equally in a physical solution. In 1976, a
California court of appeal ordered riparians to
contribute to a physical solution.94 Upstream
riparians were enjoined from taking water from
the Napa River between March 15 and May 15
for frost protection in order to leave enough
water in the river for downstream junior appro-
priators.95 The court found “the direct diversion
of water for frost protection in the crucial peri-
od constitute[d] an unreasonable use and an
unreasonable method of use of water within
the purview of the Constitution.”96 The court
rejected the idea that “riparian owners possess
a primary right to use the river flow by direct
diversion to beneficial use even if as a result no
water is left for appropriation.”97 Theoretically,
applying the rule of strict priority, a riparian
would be able to divert the full flow of a
stream, even if it left junior users high and dry.
But, in Forni, the effect of Article X, Section 2 of
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P.2d 399 (1937); Meridian Ltd. v. San Francisco, 90 P.2d 537 (1939);
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88. 45 P.2d 972, 1010 (1935) (emphasis added). 
89. See City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 60 P.2d 439,
450 (1936).
90. Id.
91. 40 P.2d 486, 499 (1935) (emphasis added).
92. 537 P.2d 1250, 1316 (1975) (emphasis added).
93. See id. at 1317.
94. See People ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v.
Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976). 
95. See id.
96. Id. at 856.
97. Id.
longstanding riparian doctrine and to apply by
constitutional mandate the doctrine of reason-
able use between riparian owners and others,
including appropriators.”98
Forni may be read to indicate that a method
of water use that serves more people is prefer-
able to a method which serves only a few, par-
ticularly if the former can be accomplished
with only moderate inconvenience to the sen-
ior water right holder. The trial court’s
approach in Mojave seems to extend from the
views expressed in Forni. The method that
serves fewer people is unreasonable when com-
pared with the other option. An unreasonable
use is illegal under the California Constitution;
therefore, it becomes legal to modify the water
rights of the senior users. 
B. Physical Solutions and Reasonable 
Use
[T]he claim that respondents’ use of
water is beneficial does not bring it
within the constitutional postulate of
reasonableness. As emphasized in
Joslin, ‘beneficial use’ cannot be equat-
ed with ‘reasonable use,’ and ‘the mere
fact that a use may be beneficial to a
riparian’s lands is not sufficient if the
use is not also reasonable within the
meaning of section 3 of Article XIV.’99
The case law on physical solutions indi-
cates that a senior user may be required to bear
some of the burden of implementing a physical
solution, or else forfeit his or her water right.
This result is often reached when it is deter-
mined that there is a more reasonable method
of use than the one currently in place. Since,
under the California Constitution, a court can
severely limit the water right of a senior user if
the use of that right is found unreasonable,100
the physical solution potentially offers the best
of all worlds. The senior user can keep the
water right, but she must contribute to a solu-
tion that allows a junior user to maintain his
water right as well. One possible consequence
of this progression of case law is that the avail-
ability of a physical solution becomes an
implicit part of determining whether a right-
holder’s use is reasonable. Rather than evalu-
ate if the use is reasonable in vacuo101 or com-
pared to other uses, the court looks at whether
the use is reasonable in light of the availability of a
physical solution. 
For example, initially, the reasonable use
analysis asked whether the overlying user was
withdrawing a reasonable amount of water, and
applying that water to a reasonable and benefi-
cial use. But, more recently, the question is
whether anyone’s water use is reasonable in light
of the fact that if everyone, including the over-
lying users, cuts back on usage, and paid for
extra water used, there could be enough water
for all parties. This seemed to be the result in
Forni, and it is the trial court’s result in Mojave. 
Extending the Forni analysis, the Mojave trial
court’s opinion is that a physical solution is a
more “equitable” choice than the historical
application of reasonable use to the priority
system. More users get some water, which
seems fair. The senior user bears some burden,
but does not lose her water right. If a senior
water right holder is putting water to an unrea-
sonable use, and if there is a reasonable phys-
ical solution, there is precedent under Forni to
apply a rule other than strict priority. 
But this is not the rule applied by the trial
court in Mojave. To apply a modified version of
the rule stated above, the trial court had to
make the following assumptions: (1) use of
water from an overdrafted groundwater basin is
per se unreasonable; (2) the proposed physical
solution provides a reasonable use and
method of use, because users who have made
investments based on an appropriative water
right will not lose that investment; and (3)
overlying users can continue to get “substantial
enjoyment” out of their water right, even once
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98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d
889 (1967)).
100. See generally Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976); Joslin v.
Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889 (1967).
101. See Joslin, 429 P.2d at 894.
The MWA argues this third point convinc-
ingly. It argues that the physical solution
imposed by the trial court in fact provides
appellants with the ability to produce more
water under the judgment than would have
been the case under an absolute priority
scheme.102 According to MWA, as of 1990 “the
amount of water produced by overlying users
alone exceeded the safe yield [of the aquifer]
by approximately 39%.”103 The judgment, on the
other hand, provides that at the end of the first
five year period, each party could still pump up
to eighty percent of its pre-1990 highest pro-
duction amount, without having to pay
replacement assessments.104
The Cardozo Appellants, however, argue
that MWA’s numbers do not reflect reality.105
Appellants’ brief to the Supreme Court sum-
marizes how the numbers used by MWA do not
accurately reflect annual water use by agricul-
ture.106 They conclude that all agricultural users
could correlatively share the annual supply of
water in the basin without reduction, and there
would still be a surplus of 2600 acre-feet.107
There are obvious environmental benefits
to the proposed physical solution. If the par-
ties had agreed to the physical solution during
settlement negotiations, and most or all had
volunteered to participate, the solution gen-
uinely would have been a huge success in
California groundwater law. But, that was not
how it happened. Instead, an independent
group of engineers devised the solution. The
group’s goal was to allocate as much water as
possible to as many parties as possible, and to
create a scheme for keeping the basin free from
overdraft.108 They clearly stated that priority
played no part in the construction of the phys-
ical solution.109
C. Proposal
The physical solution is a good idea, but it
does not seem to be based in good law. In
deciding the Mojave case, the California
Supreme Court should take this opportunity to
provide guidelines for how and when physical
solutions are to be implemented. This com-
ment proposes a three-step analysis in deter-
mining the applicability of physical solutions. 
First, a physical solution must take into
account reasonable use. If the overlying
owner’s use and method of use are reasonable,
the analysis should go no further. Of course
what is “reasonable” is within the discretion of
the court. A junior user may still offer to imple-
ment a physical solution, but there is no
requirement that the senior user contribute. As
shown in this case, some alfalfa farmers are
making as much money selling their water
allotments as they could make farming. Junior
users have every reason to provide the seniors
with an economic incentive to sell their water,
or participate in a physical solution.
Second, the court should take into consid-
eration the length of senior users’ use of
groundwater. The court should be skeptical of
the assumption that an overdrafted groundwa-
ter basin automatically makes all uses unrea-
sonable. Though this assumption makes it eas-
ier for courts to adjudicate groundwater con-
flicts, it does not take into account the obvious
harm to senior users, nor does it take into
account California water law. In the Mojave situ-
ation, many users have been drawing from an
overdrafted basin for more than thirty years.
But, if the law of priority had been applied ear-
lier, this would not have been the case. It is not
necessarily the fault of the senior user that the
basin is in overdraft, and the senior users
should not be penalized because others have
been ignoring the law. 
The Mojave trial court’s approach provides
incentives for new users to plunder an over-
drafted groundwater basin. After all, the result
in Mojave provides even the most junior user on
the system an adjudicated right to groundwa-
ter. There is also incentive for overlying users
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106. See id. at 42-44.
107. See id. at 44.
108. See Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484-85.
109. See id.
can. Overlying users were allotted a percentage
of their maximum previous use. Absent the
assumption that an overdrafted groundwater
basin creates per se unreasonable use, a senior
user’s application may still be found unreason-
able, based on a reasonable use balancing of
quantity of water used and beneficial use. 
Third, if the overlying or priority owner’s
use is unreasonable, then a physical solution
should be proposed. At this point, a senior
user may have to forfeit some of his right, as in
Forni, but only if it is found the use was deemed
unreasonable under Article X, Section 2. The
result of a finding of unreasonable use means
that all water users are at square one in terms
of water rights. Thus, in this scenario, a senior
user’s right may be diminished to allow for a
junior user to receive water. 
D. The Role of Priority 
Proper overlying use . . . is paramount, and the
right of an appropriator, being limited to the amount of
the surplus, must yield to that of the overlying owner in
the event of shortage, unless the appropriator has gained
prescriptive rights through the taking of nonsurplus
waters.110
In Mojave, the trial court and the court of
appeal adopted opposing views on the role of
priority. As detailed above, California’s ground-
water and surface water have been historically
governed by a rule of priority. Owners of land
overlying the groundwater basin (“overlying
users”) have first priority to use a reasonable
amount of groundwater on their land; any sur-
plus water after that may be appropriated to
non-overlying users.111 All overlying users have
an equal right to the water (“correlative
rights”).112 Appropriators have junior rights to
overlying users. Among appropriators, the rule
is “first in time, first in right.”113 Under a strict
priority rule, all junior users may be required to
forgo their entire share to ensure that senior
appropriators receive their full allotment. 
Applying a strict priority rule to Mojave, the
analysis might be as follows: the overlying
users are withdrawing a reasonable amount of
water, and applying it to a reasonable and ben-
eficial use. Therefore, the overlying users main-
tain their water right by priority, and the most
junior users must stop pumping until the basin
is no longer in overdraft. As many junior users
as necessary must be enjoined from withdraw-
ing water to preserve the senior user’s water
right. In Mojave, the junior users are generally
municipalities. Municipalities are in a position
to purchase water and spread the cost to the
parties receiving the water. Some farmers, on
the other hand, more often operate on a mar-
ginal basis, and could be forced out of business
if they must purchase water.114
Enjoining junior users may sound
inequitable. It is fair, however, because the pri-
ority system is a fundamental part of California
water law. Junior users are always on notice that
their water rights are somewhat uncertain and
may have to be reduced. The law of appropria-
tion is based on “surplus” water. If there is no
surplus water, there can be no appropriation.
Much of the economy of the Mojave region
developed after overdraft had begun.115 If courts
applied the law of priority more strictly, junior
users might think twice before relying on an
illusory water source. Article X, Section 2
makes clear that the law of reasonable use
applies to both overlying and appropriative
water rights. Now it seems that courts may
turn away from the idea that a senior user has
a right to the reasonable use of that water right.
“Equitable apportionment,” where everyone
deserves a piece of the pie, is threatening the
role of priority in California water law.
The trial court justified “equitable appor-
tionment” by saying that applying the rule of
strict priority might be impossible in this situ-
ation. “None of the priorities asserted by any
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110. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d at 28-
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111. See LITTLEWORTH & GARNER, supra note 15, at 50.
112. See id. at 49. 
113. See id. at 39.
114. The trial court stated as much: “[A] significant num-
ber of alfalfa farmers currently operate on a marginal basis and
will be forced out of business in the next 10 years by economic
factors.” Decision, supra note 8, at 13.
115. See Garner & Anderson, supra note 3, at 36.
allocation of water and rights mechanistically
based upon the asserted priorities would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, and would
not result in the most equitable apportionment of
water.”116 As an example of the difficulty of
determining priority, the MWA states the fol-
lowing:
Overlying users claimed that overlying
rights had priority over appropriative
uses. However, overlying rights may be
lost due to prescriptive rights acquired
by others. [citation] Many non-overly-
ing uses had been exercised for many
years during the period of overdraft.
Some of these uses began before the
mid-1950s and some began after com-
mencement of overdraft. Long contin-
ued uses which were dedicated to
municipal, domestic or other public
uses, competed with on-going overly-
ing uses for the overdrafted supply.
Municipal users claimed that dedica-
tion of water to a public use took prece-
dence over other uses. Respondent
Southern California Water Company,
for example, had been producing water
for domestic use by its customers since
before the overdraft commenced.117
MWA points out that if a user’s right is not
overlying, it is either appropriative or prescrip-
tive.118 However, City of Los Angeles limited the
doctrine of mutual prescription to the facts of
the Pasadena case.119 The parties in Mojave did
not introduce the claim of mutual prescription
at trial. MWA assumes that an appropriative
use that began in 1950 would take precedence
over an overlying use, begun more recently. The
parties disagree about whether any appropria-
tor’s use meets the criteria for prescription,
which requires actual, open and notorious, hos-
tile and adverse and uninterrupted use for five
years, under a claim of right.120
Instead of attempting to determine priori-
ties, the trial court asked whether any uses of
water were reasonable in the Mojave Basin, in
light of the fact that if all parties cut back on
their water use, and paid for any extra water
they use, there could be enough water for all
parties. And, the drafters of the physical solu-
tion were very clear in stating that they did not
accept any theory of priority of water rights.121
One of the drafters of the physical solution
testified that its purpose was not to balance
water consumption with natural supply
because: 
then the only way to achieve that would
be drastic reductions in the amount of
water being produced by a lot of peo-
ple. . . . The idea was to create a solu-
tion that generates the money neces-
sary to acquire water . . . and to cause
through economic forces water conser-
vation to take place so that in the long
term the amount of water supply need-
ed for the area will be made available.
[The drafters] did not accept any theory of priori-
ty of water rights in drafting the physical solution
because the drafting committee thought that the
results achieved were inequitable.122
In rejecting this analysis, the appeals court
noted that “neither [footnote 61 of City of Los
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117. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 43, at 31.
118. See Respondents’ Reply to Cardozo Brief on the
Merits at 13, Mojave (No. S071728) [hereinafter Respondents’
Reply].
119. See discussion supra Part III.A.3.
120. See Respondents’ Reply, supra note 118, at 13.
121. See Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484.
122. Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added).
123. In footnote 61 of Los Angeles, the court quotes a
United States Supreme Court case, Nebraska v. Wyoming. See City of
Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1298 n.61
(1975) (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945)).
Nebraska v. Wyoming was decided using “equitable apportion-
ment.” The Nebraska Court recommends a list of factors to use
when examining whether a physical solution is equitable. The
factors include climate, consumptive use in different areas, and
the extent of established uses. See Los Angeles, 537 P.2d at 1298.
Critics of the Mojave trial court’s use of equitable apportionment
point out that equitable apportionment is a federal common law
doctrine, created in the context of interstate adjudications. This
federal doctrine would not necessarily apply to an intrastate water
dispute, as is the case in Mojave. See, e.g., City and County of San
Francisco et al., Amici Curiae Brief, City of Barstow v. Mojave
Water Agency, No. S071728 (filed March 25, 1999) [hereinafter
San Francisco Brief].
California Constitution has been interpreted to
allow the trial court to disregard existing water
rights in order to fashion an allegedly equi-
table solution based on prior usage rather than
current beneficial use.”124
In California, the lines of priority are not
clearly drawn between the urban and agricul-
tural users, though some in Mojave make that
claim.125 There are California cities that hold
very senior water rights, and are on the same
side as the farmers in this case. The city of San
Francisco, for example, filed an amicus brief
supporting the Cardozo Appellants and the
rule of priority.126 We are not at a point where
California can draw the line of reasonable use
somewhere between farms and cities. The pri-
ority system, which has until now been the law
of groundwater in California, draws a line that
all users acknowledge between senior and jun-
ior users. 
E. The Role of Certainty 
Both sides of the controversy use the con-
cept of “certainty” to bolster their arguments.
The California Supreme Court has said that
uncertainty “inhibits long range planning and
investment for the development and use of
waters.”127 The Appellants echo the court of
appeal, which said: “[U]ncertainty is promoted
by a judgment which disregards all existing
and future riparian, overlying, and prescriptive
rights, and allocates water on the basis of the
amount of actual production (regardless of . . .
right to produce) in one of the five years prior
to the filing of the suit.”128 Appellants stress
that “water producers . . . must have some
objective basis, some dependable measure of
the extent of their rights, prior to filing suit.”129
The respondents, on the other hand, argue
that limiting unexercised riparian or overlying
rights and quantifying water rights as part of a
stream or basin adjudication creates certainty.
Under strict priority law, these users are
allowed to take as much water as they can rea-
sonably use. Since this is not necessarily a set
amount from year to year, it leaves a lot of
uncertainty for the appropriative users, who
are only allowed to take “surplus.”
The implementation of the physical solu-
tion in the Mojave case adds nothing to the law
of certainty. In fact, the physical solution cre-
ates uncertainty. Every water right holder in
California has a reason to worry that someday
a court could wave an adjudicatory wand and,
under the guise of equity, limit a longstanding
water right. 
F. Proposal
To create certainty in groundwater law the
state needs to implement a system for moni-
toring consumptive use. There is currently no
statewide system for regulating and permitting
groundwater. The state, however, if loath to
permit groundwater use, could implement a
“water use registry.” All water users on a system
would have to register the quantity of water
used annually. The state would need to imple-
ment incentives to encourage users to register.
If the Mojave physical solution stands, there will
be no incentive for holders of water rights to
register their use; the registration would only
be used against them, to limit their consump-
tion. But, if the law of priority stands, the state
could offer assurances that no registered water
right being put to reasonable use would be
unreasonably limited. This assurance would
not be a stretch of the state’s authority, since
“reasonable use” is the current rule of ground-
water in California. Registration would also
help build a case for prescription. It will be eas-
ier for a user to prove the use of another’s
water right over five years if the prescriptive
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124. Mojave, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
125. The Chicago Tribune labeled the controversy “farm
versus city.” See Brandon supra note 2, at C3.
126. See San Francisco Brief, supra note 123.
127. In re Rights to Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream
System, 599 P.2d 656, 666 (1988).
128. Cardozo Brief, supra note 105, at 40.
129. Id.
G. The Role of Reasonable Use
[A]s epitomized in Peabody, [Article X,
Section 2 says]: 1. The right to the use of water
is limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served. 2.
Such right does not extend to the waste of
water. 3. Such right does not extend to unrea-
sonable use or unreasonable method of use or
unreasonable method of diversion of water.130
If the California Supreme Court chooses to
enforce the physical solution, it could deter-
mine that the overlying owners’ uses are unrea-
sonable. As noted above, the Mojave trial court
said that drawing water from an overdrafted
groundwater basin is per se unreasonable.131 But
in the case of growing alfalfa,132 there may be
another unreasonable use. There are organiza-
tions that argue that growing alfalfa in the
desert should be deemed an unreasonable use
of water. Some of the elements that may be
considered when determining reasonableness
include: (1) efficiency of use and diversion; (2)
purpose of the use; (3) economic wealth and
benefit generated and alternative competing
uses; and (4) environmental value.133
According to an article written by the
Natural Resources Defense Council (“NRDC”),
alfalfa uses twenty-five percent of the state’s
irrigation water, but accounts for only four per-
cent of the state’s agricultural revenue.134
Growing alfalfa requires flood irrigation. Flood
“irrigation methods may direct as little as half
of the irrigation water to the crop.”135 If alfalfa
farmers could reduce the amount of water they
are using without affecting their output, this
could be used as a factor in finding an unrea-
sonable use of water. The NRDC report states
that with alternative technologies, farmers can
save fifteen to twenty percent of irrigation
water.136 The physical solution imposed by the
Mojave trial court requires a twenty percent
reduction over five years. Without forcing
issues of priority, the supreme court could
enforce the physical solution on alfalfa farm-
ers. If the NRDC’s numbers are correct, the
farmers retain the substantial enjoyment of
their water right, and adhere to the trial court’s
physical solution. 
It is not unprecedented for a California
court to evaluate an established commercial
venture and determine that use is no longer
reasonable.137 In 1967, in Joslin v. Marin Municipal
Water District, the California Supreme Court was
asked to determine if an upstream appropria-
tor of water (Marin Municipal Water District
(“MMWD”)), was liable in damages to plaintiffs,
downstream riparian owners. MMWD appropri-
ated water previously used by Joslin in a sand
and gravel business. The court determined that
Joslin’s $250,000 a year sand and gravel busi-
ness served “no public policy,” and thus under
Article X, Section 2, Joslin’s water use had
become unreasonable.138 As noted earlier, an
unreasonable use can lead to the loss of one’s
water right. The court balanced the “public pol-
icy” value of Joslin’s sand and gravel business
with the Marin Water District’s permit to appro-
priate water for municipal water supply pur-
poses.139 A beneficial use, once reasonable, was
found unreasonable when compared to a “bet-
ter” beneficial use. For Joslin to make his
$250,000 a year, however, he required the nor-
mal flow of the creek to deposit the sand and
gravel on his land. 
Rather than standing for the proposition
that municipal uses are superior to a sand and
gravel business, Joslin may indicate that any use
requiring the full flow of the creek is unreason-
able, as it unduly limits any uses upstream.
The logic is similar to Forni,140 where the ripari-
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left other users with little or no water. In both
cases, users were actively applying a water
right to a constructive use. That use was not
relevant to the reasonable use analysis, how-
ever, since the method of use was deemed
unreasonable. Applying this logic to Mojave, an
overlying user’s method of use could be unrea-
sonable if the result is the extinguishment of
another’s right to use the water. This result is
contrary to the strict law of priority, but it may
be the result of the rule of priority when tem-
pered by reasonable use. 
As Forni and Joslin suggest, even if an over-
lying user’s application of groundwater is ben-
eficial, it is not automatically “reasonable”
within the meaning of the California
Constitution. According to Forni and Pasadena,
what is reasonable is the use that allows the
most users a reasonable share. In Forni, ripari-
ans cannot use all the water, simply because it
is their right; in Pasadena, the overlying users
must share with appropriators if they have
been sharing all along. In Mojave, the trial court
came to a similar conclusion: spread the limit-
ed quantity available to many, rather than limit
it to the few who, by common law, have a right
to that use.
The overriding constitutional considera-
tion is to put the water resources of the state to
a reasonable use and make them available for
the constantly increasing needs of all the peo-
ple. In order to attain this objective, the ripari-
an owners may properly be required to endure
some inconvenience or to incur reasonable
expenses.141
VI. Conclusion
There are obvious advantages to the phys-
ical solution, including conserving local water,
mending the overdraft in the Mojave Basin,
and raising money to purchase supplemental
water. The trial court’s decision, however, disre-
gards many years of California water law. If the
California Supreme Court allows the physical
solution to be imposed on all parties, it will set
a precedent that a reasonable use of water by a
senior water right holder is not safe from
restriction or even elimination. 
The reasonable use doctrine has placed
limits on the law of priority. A court can apply
“reasonable use” to severely limit senior water
rights when the court determines a previously
accepted and beneficial use is no longer rea-
sonable. Perhaps in this case it is unreason-
able that so many parties were drawing from an
overdrafted groundwater basin for so long. But,
as long as the reasonable use analysis remains
entirely at the discretion of the court, with no
set guidelines for that determination, no user
can have confidence in the validity of his or her
priority-based water right. 
Upholding the priority system would dis-
courage newer users from relying on water
from an overdrafted groundwater basin. If
courts continue to simply divide up the exist-
ing amount of water among an ever-growing
number of users, soon no single user will
receive enough water to maintain a farm, a
business or a city.
California water law does need more cer-
tainty. To achieve this, the supreme court or
the legislature should establish guidelines for
applying the reasonable use doctrine to priori-
ty law. To allow the Mojave physical solution to
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